Young generations demand substantially more social insurance than older generations, although program rules have been constant for decades. I postulate a model where the utility of taking up social insurance bene…ts depends on the past behavior of older generations. The model is estimated with individual panel data. The intertemporal mechanism estimated can account for half of the younger generations'higher demand for social insurance bene…ts. Instrumenting for older generations' behavior using mortality rates reveals an even stronger in ‡uence of reference group behavior on individual demand for bene…ts. The analysis suggests that behavioral responses to the provision of welfare state bene…ts estimated by natural experiments are likely to strongly underestimate the true long-run elasticities relevant for the …scal sustainability of the welfare state.
…scal sustainability of welfare state programs. The …scal sustainability of programs cannot be assessed by the short-run e¤ects the treatment e¤ect literature has focused on.
I study behavior during the decades following the expansion of the welfare state in Sweden. I focus on the take up of sick leave bene…ts, which replace lost earnings due to illness or injury. 1 The average take up rate was 54 percent in 1974 and 69 percent in 1990, as seen in Figure 1 . Take up increased by almost one percentage point per year during a period when program generosity was constant.
Plotting the behavior by birth cohort presents an even clearer pattern, as 1 Take up is de…ned as receiving some (that is, at least one day of) bene…ts during the year. Analyzing sick leave take up in Sweden has one distinct advantage compared to other behavior. The take up decision is completely at the individual's discretion. Behavior is determined by demand, unlike other programs such as unemployment bene…ts whose use is also determined by supply side factors.
My empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. First, I account for a large number of factors that could in ‡uence bene…t take up and potentially explain the cohort trend seen in Figure 2 ; this trend persists. Second, I write down a model of work norm transmission and estimate a mechanism that could explain the cohort trend. To make a stronger case for a causal relationship I use instrumental variables, to address concerns that health trends drive the results.
Models study how institutions and behavior interact in the long run, in particular, how work norms shape bene…t use. The mechanism I estimate is closely related to the evolution of work norms in Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (2003) . 3 Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) model how work norms paved the way for a capitalist society. I study how these same work norms may respond in the long run to the introduction of the welfare state. Work norms are non-cognitive skills that may capture persistence and patience that the recent human capital literature has studied, see for example Almlund et al (2011) . My analysis sheds light on how these skills are formed across generations and time. 4 I allow for the bene…t up take to depend on the sick leave behavior of peers, hence the behavior of slightly older role models can in ‡uence the individual's own decision. 5 The model is estimated using individual panel data, applying both pooled and within estimators. I account for non-linear time e¤ects to rule out secular trends in behavior. The estimated coe¢ cients indicate that the model could account for up to half of the cohort trend in Figure 2 .
To make a stronger case for a causal e¤ect of role model behavior on individual sick leave take up I use mortality rates as an instrument. Mortality rates capture health shocks that also a¤ect sick leave. I …nd a strong reference group in ‡uence on individual sick leave behavior using both variation across 3 Bisin and Verdier (2004) model work norms in the welfare state. 4 Evidence on the intergenerational transmission from attitudes towards bene…ts use to general altruistic attitudes is prestented in Ljunge (2012a) . 5 The reference group in ‡uence may be interpreted as a psychic cost that captures, internal or external, stigma or some other e¤ect that is captured by the reference group's behavior such as social learning or health consciousness. individuals as well as within individuals over the life cycle. Results are robust to controlling for the mortality rates in the individual's own cohort, lending some plausibility to the identifying assumption that the mortality rates of older cohorts in the past has no direct in ‡uence on the individual's current sick leave take up.
The paper makes three contributions. First, I document large di¤erences in sick leave behavior across cohorts, di¤erences that can't be explained by observable factors. Second, I estimate a model that can explain half of the increase in bene…t use across generations. Third, I make a compelling case that the estimated mechanism represents a causal relationship. Quantifying the size of the increased demand for social insurance and estimating a speci…c mechanism through which this adjustment takes place is an empirical question that, to my knowledge, I am the …rst to address.
The paper complements anthropological studies on sick leave in Sweden like Hansen (2005, 2009 ) who …nd a generational divide in attitudes towards work and bene…ts use. I present unique quantitative evidence on how individuals adapt to institutions over time and across generations. The estimated dynamic model di¤ers from the previous cultural transmission literature that has focused on determinants of di¤erent equilibria, but largely ignored the analysis of the path towards a new equilibrium. 6 The analysis is fundamentally distinct from the social interactions literature and from studies of the persistent e¤ects of institutions in that both literatures are based on cross-sectional differences. 7 I study intertemporal di¤erences, across generations and within life cycles, to examine how individuals adapt to social conditions. The treatment e¤ect literature has focused on short-run evaluations of policy changes, which certainly are important questions, but at the expense of considering long-run e¤ects that might dwarf the short-run responses.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related 6 See for example Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) and Tabellini (2010) , as well as the handbook chapter by Bisin and Verdier (2010) . 7 Studies of the in ‡uence of culture using immigrants, surveyed in Fernandez (2010) , have a similar focus on cross-sectional di¤erences.
literature. The third section describes the sick leave program, followed by the data description. Section 5 examines the cohort trend by accounting for individual characteristics. In the sixth section I develop the empirical model and the empirical results are presented. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The study of long term adjustments in demand for social insurance, where individual behavior is followed across decades, complements several existing literatures. The e¤ect of norms on labor supply (or bene…t up take) has been studied both theoretically and empirically. The model I develop is most closely related The model is calibrated and the predictions of the model are close to the observed trends. Their emphasis on a model consistent with the data, without claims to a causal mechanism, is di¤erent from this paper's focus on examining a causal mechanism to explain the cohort trend.
There is a growing literature on the impact of beliefs or culture on economic outcomes and the paper is closely related to studies of how institutions and policy interact with beliefs. 8 supply e¤ects, compared to the discretionary individual decision to demand sick leave I study. Both these papers studying sick leave in Sweden are very similar in their focus on contemporaneous social e¤ects. 9 This paper, in contrast, focuses on the long run adaptation in the demand for social insurance bene…ts. 8 See the handbook edited by Benhabib, Bisin, and Jackson (2010). 9 Similar evidence on sick leave is found in Italy, see Ichino and Maggi (2000) .
Furthermore, the e¤ects of social norms have been studied in the context of unemployment insurance, a related social insurance program, see Eugster, Lalive, and Zweimueller (2012), Stutzer and Lalive (2004) , and Clark (2003) . None of these studies of social interactions have analyzed the intertemporal adaptation process, which I do.
The Sick Leave Program
Sweden has a generous publicly run sick leave insurance program that covers lost earnings in the case of basically any injury or illness. 10 It is very easy to claim the bene…ts. For the …rst week of each spell, the law gives the individual the discretion to determine if he is …t to work or not. If he wants to claim the sick leave bene…ts he makes two phone calls, one to the social insurance o¢ ce and one to his employer. 11 There is no …xed allocation of sick leave days, you can use the insurance as long as your sickness requires and for as many spells as you like. For spells up to 7 days the individual himself determines if he is …t to work. For spells longer than 7 days it is required that a physician validates your condition. 12 Monitoring of actual sickness is very light, at least in part due to the di¢ culty in verifying conditions like stomach ache and back pain.
The program is similar to any social insurance. It pays out bene…ts if the individual is hit by some shock. In the sick leave program it is a health shock, while unemployment bene…ts cover unemployment shocks and pensions pay out based on age. What sets the sick leave program apart is the level of individual discretion with respect to claiming bene…ts. The decision to claim bene…ts rests entirely with the individual, and observed take up behavior is purely driven by the demand for bene…ts. This is the case for short spells, which do not require a doctor visit. By focusing on take up, rather than days of leave, I can measure 1 0 In a comparison to the U.S. the program encompasses both 'personal days' provided in employment contracts (although restricted to sick leave) and the workers' compensation program. 1 
Data
I use registry data on individual panels over the period 1974 to 1990 (from 1973 for lagged income). 15 I follow a random sample of the 1974 population for 17
years. The baseline regression has just short of 2 million observations based on 1 3 The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1973:465. 1 4 The updates to the program are detailed in law SFS 1987:223. 1 5 The analysis ends in 1990 since later reforms make the data hard to compare. The employers take over sick leave payments for the …rst two weeks of each spell, which is not observed in the data. Such longer term sick leave is very di¤erent from what is analyzed here.
the behavior of about 160,000 individuals. Birth cohorts from 1917 to 1963 are included. About 3 percent of the population is sampled. 16 Household members are included in the data, so I can control for the household composition and spousal income. The data draw information from several sources; demographic information from the population registry, income information from the tax authorities, and various public bene…ts from the social insurance administration.
The main dependent variable, participation in the sick leave programs, is de…ned based on observing positive sick leave bene…ts during the year. Data on sector of work is available from 1979 and on. Individuals are included in the analysis from ages 22 to 60. The age restrictions are due to the looser connection to the labor market of individuals at the tails of the life cycle. The young may still be studying and may not have a …rm foot in the labor market. At ages close to retirement individuals face a number of incentives to leave the labor force that aren't modeled here, and those observations are excluded. Since the sick leave program is designed to replace lost labor earnings, the analysis is restricted to individuals who are labor force participants. 17 Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
5 Increased Demand For Social Insurance
Aggregate Trends
It is possible the raw averages in Figure 2 capture life cycle patterns, for example, young generations are observed when they have young children that may make them take more sick leave during those years. This issue is examined further below.
Comparing the cohorts that are of age 25 and 45 in 1974, born in 1929 and 1949, I …nd that the share that never takes sick leave has dropped from 13.8 to 1.6 percent. Further evidence on this shift in the distribution of sick leave across cohorts is presented in Figure 4 . The …gure plots the distribution of how often individuals use the sick leave program across cohorts. 21 For the oldest cohort 1 7 Labor force participation is de…ned as having positive labor earnings during the year. 1 8 There are at least two causes for this. Parents may use the sick leave program to take care of sick children, or sick children make the parents sick. 1 9 Note also that there is no drop o¤ after the main child rearing ages, indicating that this factor does not drive the cohort trend.
2 0 This would be a concern if the marginal labor force participants are more prone to use sick leave. 
Baseline Regression
So far only raw averages have been presented. Column 1 of Table 2 One concern may be that the raw average is confounded by life cycle patterns, which may vary by groups as seen in Figure 3 . I include a full set of interactions between gender, the four education groups, 22 age and age squared.
Including these controls raise the estimated cohort trend as seen in column 2, indicating that life cycle patterns mask an even stronger cohort trend. 23 If parents with young children take more sick leave, and these parents are mostly observed among the younger cohorts, it may bias the estimate of the cohort trend upwards. Detailed controls of the number of children at di¤erent ages are included in column 3, and the estimated cohort trend is similar to the previous speci…cation.
Younger cohorts tend to have higher education and may have higher earnings (conditional on age) than older cohorts. If sick leave is a normal good, it could be that the higher take up rate is in part an income e¤ect. I control for own earnings and capital income as well as the spouse's income (if present). The income variables are lagged one year since current income and sick leave take up may be jointly determined. I also control for regional business cycles (through the regional employment rate) and regional …xed e¤ects. 24 These controls do not a¤ect the cohort trend much, as seen in column 4. Sample: Labor force participants, 22-60 years old.
It is possible that not only current earnings but lifetime earnings a¤ect the sick leave choice. Using the panel data, I run an individual …xed e¤ect (within) regression of individual earnings on the age-gender-education interactions mentioned above and business cycle controls. The individual …xed e¤ect from that 2 4 The objective is not to explain regional di¤erences in take up. There are 8 regions.
regression is the measure of permanent income, which I include in the regression in column 5. Permanent income has little impact on the cohort trend.
Linearity of the income e¤ects may be a strong assumption that is relaxed in column 6. I construct …ve piece splines of both permanent income and lagged income. 25 This allows the income e¤ects to di¤er across quintiles both for permanent and lagged income. The estimated cohort trend remains stable at 1 percentage point per birth cohort. The speci…cation in column 6 is the baseline in the analysis below.
Non-Linearity
I replace the linear cohort trend assumed in Table 2 with …xed e¤ects for each cohort. The estimated coe¢ cients, after having accounted for all the controls in speci…cation 6, are plotted in Figure 5 . 26 The cohort e¤ects are quite close to a linear trend, so the linearity assumption does not seem to drive the result.
Health Trends
Deteriorating health for younger cohorts could be an explanation for the co- Note: Estimated cohort e¤ects after controlling for demographics, income, etc.
were 16.7 and 11.2. Reductions in mortality rates are seen at most points in the age distribution across cohorts (Source: NORDCAN). Improvements in health conditions across cohorts make the sick leave trends more surprising.
Robustness
Even though a host of factors were controlled for above there may still be alternative explanations to the trend. One concern may be the measurement of sick leave bene…ts. Up until 1983 maternity leave was included in sick leave bene…ts but starting in 1984 the parental leave in connection to the birth of a child was reported separately. In addition, care for sick child was reported separately from 1987. The sick leave variable is rede…ned as take up of any of the three programs (sick leave, parental leave, and care for sick child), but it does not a¤ect the estimated cohort trend as seen in speci…cation 1 in Table   3 . 27 Since sick leave is not the only program individuals may use it is possible that there is some shifting across programs, which could in ‡uence the estimate.
To examine the sensitivity to the use of other programs I exclude individuals who have taken up either unemployment bene…ts or welfare payments during the year. The estimated cohort trend in speci…cation 2 in Table 3 is slightly lower with this sample restriction, indicating a stronger trend among individuals that use other programs. 28 ; 29 As the main regressions condition on being in the labor force there may be concerns that individuals that have left the labor force would have been on sick leave if they had remained in the labor force. In particular, there may be concerns that among the older people only the healthy remain in the labor force, which could drive the …nding. To address this concern the sample is restricted to those between 22 and 45 years of age, where there is little exit from the labor force. This restriction does not a¤ect the cohort trend as seen in speci…cation 3 in Table 3 . 30 Another approach is to assume that everyone outside the labor force would have been on sick leave had they been in the labor force. I rede…ne sick leave such that all individuals outside the labor force are added to the sick leave rolls (and there is no longer a sample requirement on being in the labor force). The estimated trend is similar also in this speci…cation. Changes in labor force composition can't explain the cohort trend.
The …fth speci…cation examines if the cohort trend could be explained by di¤erent take up rates across time by including year …xed e¤ects. In this speci…cation the age controls have to be excluded in order to identify the cohort trend (but the gender-education interactions are included). The estimated cohort trend is still large and signi…cant indicating that the cohort trend can't be explained by generally rising demand for bene…ts. The model has been estimated for men and women separately. The cohort trend is a bit stronger for women, and in particular unmarried women. 31 Estimating cohort …xed e¤ects by gender also show a close to linear cohort trend, and women on average have higher take up rates than men across birth cohorts. 32 
Unemployment Insurance
Running the baseline regression with unemployment insurance take up, rather than sick leave, as the dependent variable produces a signi…cant cohort trend towards higher take up rates for younger cohorts. 33 The …nding supports the hypothesis that the cohort trend is prevalent more generally. Unemployment insurance is a social insurance program just like the sick leave program. Unemployment insurance is, however, di¤erent in several respects. There are some supply side restrictions like veri…cation that the bene…ciary is not employed and that the bene…ciary is required to register with the unemployment o¢ ce. 
where w > 0, 0 < 1, and 0. is the valuation of leisure (it may be negative or positive) that varies between individuals. 36 The valuation of leisure is distributed according to cumulative distribution function , with positive density on the whole real line. I may also allow for heterogeneity in w across individuals and time.
There is a valuation of leisure that makes an individual indi¤erent between taking up bene…ts or not. Denote this valuation of leisure by = ln + . The take up rate of the social insurance bene…t in the economy, call it z, corresponds to the fraction with > , that is,
The current non-monetary cost depends on the share of transfer recipients in group m in the previous time period; t = h (z m;t 1 ). 37 Furthermore, h : Individuals take prices, preference parameters, and z m;t 1 , and hence the non-monetary cost, as given. The equilibrium outcome in period t is a take up rate for each group n, z n;t , who is in ‡uenced by past behavior of group m, such that
In a steady state (3) holds for any n; m; t.
I assume that the parametric speci…cation for the non-monetary cost is
where s 0 > s > 0: This model is taken to the data on sick leave take up in
Sweden. An individual will take up the bene…ts if ln + s 0 + sz m;t 1 > 0:
Factors that may be allowed to in ‡uence the sick leave choice are captured by a vector x i;t for individual i in period t with an associated parameter vector . These factors may be interpreted as capturing di¤erences in the valuation of leisure.
This results in an empirical model of sick leave for individual i, a member of group n, in period t, SL i;n;t , which takes on the value 1 if any sick leave bene…ts are claimed during the period and 0 otherwise. De…ne the latent variable SL i;n;t such that SL i;n;t = + x i;t + sz m;t 1 i;t and that it would be observed it if data from the earlier period was available. It could also be that the underlying distribution of preferences is not symmetric, which could produce a more linear shape also for the oldest cohorts. 3 8 The S-shaped curve is similar to the cumulative density function of a Normal distribution.
Reference groups
Role models set a standard for acceptable behavior. Such mechanisms have been discussed in the developmental psychology literature, see for example Harris (1995, 1998). 39 Anthropologists In line with the model I allow for the reference group in ‡uence to be affected by the fraction of the reference group that takes up the social insurance bene…ts. 41 I assume that individuals may be in ‡uenced by the behavior of older cohorts in a past year. When studying individual sick leave behavior I relate it to the reference group m's average sick leave take up denoted by z m . Reference group m is the cohort born 2-4 years earlier than the individual in question in the same education and sector group living in the same county. 42 The time lag is 3 years. 43 The adjustment of reference group in ‡uence is hence slow in two dimensions, through the in ‡uence of older cohorts on younger cohorts, and Rather, the speci…cation captures, in an empirically tractable way, an intergenerational spillover that is essential in the model to explain the behavior across generations in Figure 2 . 44 The average size of the reference group corresponding to colleagues is 56 and for neighbors the average size is 269 individuals.
Results
The model postulates a direct relationship between reference group behavior and individual behavior. This relationship can be estimated in the data. Under the assumption that the model is an accurate depiction of the real world (conditional 4 2 I choose the county level for two reasons. The county is an area within which most people live, work, and socialize. For practical reasons, there is also the need for a su¢ cient number of individuals of each age to compute reference group behavior. Lower levels than the county may be problematic for this reason. 4 3 For example, the reference group behavior in the year 1985 for an individual born 1955 is the average of the sick leave take up in 1982 of those born between 1951 and 1953 who live in the same county and belong to the same education-sector group. There are 24 counties in Sweden. 4 4 For example, I don't necessarily believe that all social e¤ects relate to only those born 2-4 years earlier. However, looking at those 2-4 years older is su¢ cient to capture an important mechanism that has not been studied before.
on the control variables) the slope parameter in the reference group in ‡uence function (4) is estimated, which has a structural interpretation. This would provide a clear insight for policy design by quantifying the multiplier e¤ect of an increased take up rate of the social insurance bene…ts for some age group.
All else equal, program expenditures may increase for a long time due to the e¤ect on reference group in ‡uence, which induce other individuals to take up the bene…ts, and so on. 45 It also implies that the long-run behavioral response to a change in program generosity may be much larger than the short-run response.
If the real world is more complex than the model then the interpretation of the estimates may change. It is possible that the true reference group in ‡uence is unobserved, that is, the non-monetary cost is an omitted variable like attitudes and beliefs of the reference group that in turn a¤ect individual behavior.
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Reference group behavior may then capture these attitudes and beliefs, but the Table 4 presents estimates using both the pooled OLS and the within estimators. 47 The estimates from the two methods have distinct interpretations, which are explored. The …rst three speci…cations use the pooled OLS estimator. 48 The estimate on the reference group behavior is to a large extent identi…ed from variation across individuals. The reference groups are based on the mea- 4 5 The intergenerational mechanism has the potential of explaining the pattern in Figure 2 , in contrast to a purely spatial mechanism since generations are not systematically separated spatially. 4 6 In this case we would not be able to distinguish exogenous social interactions from correlated e¤ects as discussed by Manski (1993) . 4 7 Included are the same individual and aggregate controls as in speci…cation 6 in Table 2 , except for year of birth. 4 8 The estimator assumes that individual e¤ects are randomly distributed. in Table 4 , and the estimate is strongly signi…cant.
Colleagues
The estimate is positive if the individual is more likely to take up sick leave in periods when the reference group of older people's lagged take up is relatively high. 5 1 The …xed e¤ect also captures for example labor market turbulence, which may a¤ect cohorts di¤erentially. Younger generations, who tend to have less job tenure and employment protection may be more subject to this turbulence. Ichino and Riphahn (2005) …nd that workers increase their sick leave substantially when employment protection kicks in. I …nd that young generations use sick leave more than the older in spite of these e¤ects. 5 2 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on birth cohort. This level of clustering allows for arbitrary correlations of error terms across years, skill groups, and counties within each birth cohort. There is a signi…cant impact of reference group behavior on sick leave take up in the estimation across individuals also after accounting for ‡exible time e¤ects. In speci…cation 2 in Table 4 a linear time trend is included in the pooled OLS estimation, which controls for a linear increase in the demand for sick leave over time. The coe¢ cient estimate on reference group behavior remains similar in magnitude and signi…cance. I also allow for non-linearities in the time e¤ects by including time …xed e¤ects, which account for any aggregate in ‡uences on sick leave, in speci…cation 3 in Table 4 . 53 Again, the coe¢ cient estimate on the reference group behavior remains similar to the previous speci…cations. An alternative approach to account for changes over time and generations is to include cohort …xed e¤ects rather than the time e¤ects. Such a speci…cation also produces a positive and highly signi…cant estimate on the in ‡uence of the reference group's behavior.
The in ‡uence of older generations account for between two-…fths and half of the increasing demand across generations, depending on the speci…cation. The average reference group take up for the cohort born in 1930 is 52.0 percent.
For the cohort born in 1950 the corresponding take up is 68.9 percent. By multiplying the di¤erence with the pooled estimate of 0.46 in column 1 of Table   4 the reference group's in ‡uence increases the younger cohort's take up rate by 7.8 percentage points, which is about 40 to 50 percent of what was estimated in Table 2 . Table 4 indicates that the in ‡uence of reference group behavior conditional on national behavior is similar to not conditioning on national behavior. 56 
Instrumenting for reference group behavior
To further examine the hypothesis an instrument is used to produce exogenous shifts in sick leave behavior of the reference group. I use mortality rates cor- 5 4 The raw average in column (1) of Table 2 indicates a 16 percentage point higher take up rate for the cohort born 20 years later. The estimate in column (6) of Table 2 produces a 19.6 percentage point higher take up rate for the younger cohort. 5 5 Introducing a linear time trend is not meaningful in the within context since age is already controlled for, which contains the same variation as a time trend. 5 6 The estimate in speci…cation (6) is not directly comparable to speci…cation (3) since the pooled estimate does not have a similar double di¤erence interpretation.
responding to the cohorts and locations of the reference groups to instrument for reference group behavior. 57 The idea is that mortality rates are the result of serious health shocks, which also a¤ect sick leave take up. Implicitly, I only consider variation in reference group behavior that is correlated with these serious health shocks. 58 Mortality rates are decreasing across cohorts while sick leave is increasing across cohorts. The aggregate trends are hence stacked against …nding a positive in ‡uence of mortality on sick leave, as I hypothesize.
I observe mortality rates per 1000 population by year, age and county. Mortality rates are assumed to follow a simple model with a second order polynomial in age and a random shock. Denote the mortality rate in county c, for the generation born in year g, in year t by M R c;g;t then
M R c;g;t = 0 + 1 Age t + 2 Age 2 t + " c;g;t
Mortality shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across counties, generations, and years. The model explains about 85 percent of the variation in the data. As the main regression includes controls for age and its square it's only the remaining variation in the error term that is used to provide exogenous variation in ref-
erence group behavior. I could also allow more complex models of mortality,
for example with year …xed e¤ects 59 but it would not a¤ect the analysis in the speci…cations that control for year …xed e¤ects.
The mortality rates used as instruments are de…ned as far as possible in the same way the reference group behavior is de…ned. Since mortality data is not available by education-sector groups, corresponding to the reference group 'colleagues,'the instrument is computed at a higher level. That is, the mortality rate per 1000 of those born 2-4 years earlier by county, lagged 3 years, is used to instrument for the sick leave take up by those born 2-4 years earlier by county 5 7 The instrument is not intended to explain the cohort trend in sick leave, the mortality rate just provides exogenous variation in the reference group's behavior. 5 8 These serious health shocks contrast with arguably less serious shocks to the value of leisure such as big athletic events, see Skogman- Thoursie (2004) . 5 9 Adding year …xed e¤ects to the model increases the explanatory power by about 1 percentage point. In a model with year e¤ects I could relax the assumption that health shocks are independent across counties and allow for common time trends. and education-sector group, lagged 3 years. 60 The identifying assumption for this approach is that older cohorts' mortality rates have no direct impact on individual sick leave decisions three years later. The only impact comes through the older cohorts'behavior.
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The models are estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS). The instrument exhibits variation across counties, generations, and years. The …rst stage regressions show a positive relationship between mortality rates and sick leave up take as hypothesized. The instrument is not weak. 62 The …rst stage results are reported in Table A1 in the appendix.
The second stage results are presented in Table 5 . Table 5 .
64
6 0 In the case of the reference group 'neighbors,' which does not distinguish between education-sector groups, the instrument is computed for exactly the same level as the reference group. 6 1 More formally, the assumption is that the mortality shocks in (7) for the generations 2-4 years older in year t-3 are uncorrelated with the leisure shocks to the current generation in year t in the main model (5). 6 2 The instrument has t-values of at least 5 in …rst stage regressions, and tests based on Kleibergen-Paap statistics reject the hypotheses of weak instruments and underidenti…cation. The results are robust to including county …xed e¤ects rather than regional …xed e¤ects. 6 3 The demographic interactions can be seen as controlling for learning over the life cycle, where the learning follows a second order polynomial for each of the demographic groups. 6 4 Pooled and within estimates are very similar, indicating that the estimates are identi…ed from time varying in ‡uences. Including the reference group behavior in the …rst year observed produce similar estimates as reported in the table. Overall, the estimated in ‡uence of role model behavior is larger when instrumenting with mortality rates. 65 Role model behavior shifted by these health shocks has a substantial in ‡uence on individual behavior. It indicates that the individuals in the reference groups whose sick leave is shifted by the instrument have a large in ‡uence on the behavior of younger cohorts compared to the average behavior of the group. The marginal individuals shifted by the mortality shock could hence have a large e¤ect on the non-monetary cost. It is also possible that instrumenting has removed bias due to mismeasurement of role model in ‡uence, which would lead to higher estimates. The estimates in Table   5 are fairly similar across speci…cations. That the pooled and within estimates aren't substantially di¤erent would indicate that there aren't omitted variables correlated with sick leave behavior that drive the result as the omitted factors controlled for by the individual …xed e¤ect doesn't a¤ect the estimates.
Challenges to the identi…cation include omitted time trends at the county level that correlate with both reference group mortality and behavior. One candidate may be di¤erential trends in productivity across counties, as individuals in counties with low productivity growth may …nd it increasingly bene…cial to take sick leave relative to counties with high productivity growth. If these productivity trends were correlated with mortality rates it may confound the results. Average labor earnings by county are controlled for to capture such trends.
66
The mortality shocks used as instruments could capture health shocks that are common to all cohorts. Examples could be a contaminated water supply or pollution from a factory. It may be important to account for health shocks that a¤ect the individual studied as well as his reference group. The results are robust to including the current mortality rate of the individual's own cohort as a control variable, as seen in Table 6 . 67 ;68 ;69 This control captures local trends that a¤ect the mortality shocks of both the own cohort and the reference group.
I am hence controlling for common in ‡uences on mortality and only variation in mortality speci…c to the reference group is used to identify the in ‡uence of reference group behavior. The results in Table 6 are very similar to Table 5, indicating that common shocks to mortality across cohorts do not drive the results. Omitted trends that would challenge the identi…cation would not only have to correlate with the reference group's mortality and sick leave across 6 6 The results are also robust to controlling for county level …xed e¤ects. 6 7 The results are also robust to controlling for the own cohort's mortality rate lagged 3 years (rather than the current rate). In all cases these mortality rates are measured at the county level just like the reference group's mortality rates. 6 8 This may be interpreted as relaxing the assumption that the health shocks in (7) are independent across generations and time. 6 9 The relatively weak in ‡uence of the own cohorts mortality rate in table 6 may seem at odds with the …rst stage results. However, one may separate the mortality shocks into one part related to sick leave and one part that is unrelated to sick leave. The part that is unrelated to sick leave only produces noise in the estimation, and the results indicate that this noise is cancelled out when averaged across cohorts. counties, cohorts, and time; the trends would also have to be uncorrelated with the own cohort's mortality rate. Hence, these county level trends would have to di¤er in a very particular way for generations born a few years apart. The instrumental variables approach deals with potential sorting, for example that individuals with a high valuation of leisure could move to places where the non-monetary cost of claiming sick leave bene…ts is low. First, the individual …xed e¤ect accounts for that individuals di¤er in their valuation of leisure in unobservable ways wherever they reside. Second, in the within speci…cations unexplained mortality shocks are used to get exogenous variation in reference group behavior. The mortality shocks are hence positive some years, and for some cohorts, and negative in other periods. Migration ‡ows don't match the patterns of unexplained mortality shocks.
Neighbors
In this section I turn to an alternative speci…cation of the reference group. The approach is intended to capture the in ‡uence of neighbors, who may provide an in ‡uence beyond the colleagues studied above. The reference group is de…ned as those cohorts born 2-4 years earlier who live in the individual's county.
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The same 3 year time lag is used as above. With the reference group labeled neighbors there is variation across 41 birth cohorts and 24 counties. Table 7 presents the estimates based on the pooled OLS and within estimators in speci…cations that mirror Table 4 Table 7 is a bit larger than the estimate based on colleagues. Including the year …xed e¤ects in speci…cation 6 produces a larger estimate of 0.28. It indicates that conditioning on the average national behavior may be important when neighbors are considered as the reference group.
7 0 This de…nition of reference groups have more observations as it is possible to use more years of the sample where sector information is not available. 7 1 The …rst year sick leave behavior is observed is year 1974 for most reference groups, and a later year for a few cohorts that enter the sample after 1977. 
Instrumenting
There may be concerns that the estimates on Table 7 don't capture a causal
e¤ect. An instrumental variables approach is applied where the mortality rate for cohorts born 2-4 years earlier who reside in the same county is used to instrument for the reference groups behavior. The groups for which the instrument is computed match the reference groups. Both the pooled and the within models are estimated by 2SLS. The …rst stage estimates, which are positive as hypothesized, are reported in Table A2 . The …rst stages are not weak. The estimates of the pooled model are about 0.8 as seen in the …rst three speci…cations in Table 8 . The estimates are a bit higher than the 0.7 estimated in Table 5 . The results indicate that the in ‡uence of the reference group could be a bit stronger when looking at the broader group of neighbors rather than colleagues, although the con…dence intervals overlap. The estimate of 0.79 in the within speci…cation in column 4 in Table 8 is almost exactly the same as in Table 5 . The estimate in column 5 of Table 8 , where the year …xed e¤ect are included, are higher than the previous estimate and follow the same pattern as without instrumenting in Table 7 . 72 The estimates in Table 8 There may be a concern that the mortality shocks are driven by a factor common to all generations, as discussed above. Including the mortality rate of the own cohort in the county accounts for mortality shocks common across 7 3 The results are robust to controlling for county …xed e¤ects.
cohorts. Results are presented when including the current mortality rate of the individual's own cohort in Table 9 . Results are very similar if also the mortality rate lagged 3 years is included. The estimates in Table 9 are very similar to conventional levels, in line with the hypothesis. 75 In an additional test I create reference groups in a faraway county. I assign the individual a county that corresponds to a faraway county, and match it with the corresponding reference group behavior and instrument. Adding the faraway reference group to the model returns an insigni…cant estimate on the reference group's behavior in the 7 4 I have also estimated a model where the reference group is 2-4 year younger, which would correspond to a model with young 'trend setters'. I …nd a signi…cant e¤ect, although its signi…cance is much lower than for the model with older reference groups. For this reason I prefer the model with older reference groups. 7 5 Note that the lead of the reference group's behavior is the valid 'placebo' treatment in this setting. As individuals may be in ‡uenced by several other cohorts it would not be valid to use some di¤erent cohorts as placebos. I don't claim that the estimated reference group is the one and only in ‡uence. I do claim to …nd one channel of reference group in ‡uence that captures one important intertemporal channel of behavior. 
Health consciousness
Younger generations could have a greater awareness of how their actions a¤ect their health along the lines of Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Ehrlich (2000) .
The young cohorts could hence use sick leave based on a pre-cautionary motive where they invest in their health by taking sick leave.
76 Such behavior could explain at least part of the increasing take up across generations in Figure 2 .
To the extent this health consciousness di¤er systematically across cohorts and individuals it is captured by the individual …xed e¤ects in the within regressions.
An additional issue is if the health consciousness responds to the mortality shocks for the reference groups (lagged 3 years) used in the regressions above.
Such an interpretation is possible. However, it is a bit surprising, from this perspective, that the e¤ect through the reference group is so strong relative to the e¤ect of the own cohort's mortality rate (both the current and past rates), which arguably would have a larger and direct e¤ect on the individual's health
consciousness. Yet, with such a health consciousness di¤erence across cohorts it may be expected that the in ‡uence of reference group behavior di¤ers across cohorts. I have estimated a model where the reference group in ‡uence is allowed to di¤er between older and younger cohorts. The point estimate for reference group in ‡uence is lower for the older cohorts compared to the younger cohorts but the di¤erence is not signi…cant. While the point estimates are consistent with this interpretation, the evidence does not support signi…cant di¤erences in reference group in ‡uence across cohorts.
Monitoring
It could be possible that di¤erent generations are subject to di¤erent monitoring or punishment. If older generations are punished more severely for using the sick leave program it could lead to lower take up among these generations.
Employers would be the ones delivering the punishments since the monitoring by the social insurance administration is basically non-existent during the period. Any systematic di¤erences across individuals would be captured by the individual …xed e¤ects. The remaining concern is that monitoring would covary with reference group behavior and mortality rates across individual life cycles.
Given that the reference group's mortality rate is lagged three years there is no obvious reason to expect the current monitoring of the own cohort to depend on these factors, in particular since the own cohort's mortality shocks are controlled for. However, if such di¤erences exist they may be expected to di¤er by sector. Private pro…t maximizing …rms may have a stronger incentive to punish potential shirkers compared to public sector employers. Estimating the model for public and private employees separately do not reveal any signi…cant di¤erences between the reference groups in ‡uences, indicating that di¤erential monitoring across generations does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ects.
Colleagues could be monitors. One way this could work is that there are few colleagues around to monitor if they are on sick leave themselves, but it is not clear that their absence three years ago would have an e¤ect on current sick leave. Another channel is if a larger absence among colleagues would make the individual care less about any potential punishment from the colleagues, but this channel would be one example of the non-monetary cost hypothesized in the model above and hence …t well with the main interpretation of the results.
Taking Stock
Reference group behavior, as shifted by mortality shocks, has a direct in ‡uence on individual sick leave decisions. The identifying assumption is that there aren't omitted local trends that correlate with reference group mortality and behavior but are uncorrelated with the mortality of those a couple of years younger. I may entertain stories that there are local trends in for example drug abuse (or pollution) that a¤ect both sick leave and mortality. Such trends could potentially challenge the identi…cation since both reference group sick leave and mortality as well as individual sick leave could be a¤ected by the same drug abuse trend. It is reassuring that the in ‡uence of role model behavior is robust to including the own cohort's mortality rate, as the own group's mortality would capture the drug abuse trend. 77 Using reference group mortality as an instrumental variable, and controlling for the mortality of the individual's own cohort, makes a compelling case that one channel of intertemporal in ‡uence in sick leave choices has been identi…ed. 
Conclusion

